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Abstract— A reliable routing control plane in Internal Border
Gateway Protocol (IBGP) is very important for achieving de-
pendable Internet data communication. However, the reliability
modeling of IBGP and the design of reliable IBGP route re-
flection networks, which are of great importance to increase the
robustness of IBGP operations, have not been well investigated.
The reliability analysis of IBGP networks, which are overlaid
on top of IP networks, is challenging, because failures of IBGP
sessions may be correlated through the shared IGP routes. In this
paper, we first present a model for the reliability analysis in IBGP
networks to characterize correlated failures, followed by two
metrics to measure the reliability of IBGP. Then, we investigate
the optimization problems of finding the most reliable IBGP route
reflection topologies. We show that the problems in general are
NP-hard and an optimization bound is thus provided. Moreover,
we develop efficient algorithms for searching satisfactory near-
optimal topologies in general scenarios, as well as the optimal
solutions in some special networks. Our study shows that route
reflection topologies considerably influence the reliability of IBGP
operations. By applying our models and optimization techniques,
a route reflection topology can be appropriately configured and
the IBGP robustness can be improved significantly.
I. INTRODUCTION
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [1] is the widely used inter-
domain routing protocol. Two BGP routers, which communi-
cate with each other directly, are called BGP peers. BGP peers
exchange routing information via BGP sessions which are run-
ning over TCP. According to the relation of BGP peers, BGP
itself can be divided into two parts: External BGP (EBGP) and
Internal BGP (IBGP). An EBGP session connects two BGP
routers which reside in different Autonomous Systems (AS),
while an IBGP session links two BGP routers which belong to
the same AS. In this paper, we focus on reliability modeling
for the IBGP network which consists of BGP routers in one
AS and the IBGP sessions among them.
A. Internal BGP Networks
In a traditional IBGP network, IBGP sessions form a full
mesh over all BGP routers in a domain. A hierarchical IBGP
structure, called route reflection [2], was proposed to solve
the scalability limitation in the full mesh design. Fig. 1 shows
an example of two-level IBGP route reflection network. BGP
routers are divided into three clusters. In each cluster, at least
one router is chosen as a route reflector (e.g., A, B, E and
I in Fig. 1), and other routers are route-reflector clients. In
cluster I, redundant reflectors are used for higher reliability.
All reflectors establish a full mesh via IBGP sessions. A client
is only required to share IBGP sessions with the reflectors in
its cluster. The sessions between clients of the same cluster are
optional. For example, an optional session may be established
between K and J . A client is the traditional BGP router and
it only needs to communicate with its reflectors. A reflector
is responsible for: (1) reflecting routes (routing information)
from its client to the peer reflectors and the other clients; (2)
reflecting routes from its peer reflectors to its clients. The
CLUSTER LIST loop detection mechanism prevents routes
from being reflected back to the clusters where the routes
originate.
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Fig. 1. An example of IBGP route reflection network. Routers are grouped
into three clusters. Solid lines stand for IP links; dotted lines stand for IBGP
sessions. Shaded nodes represent route reflectors.
Route reflection network and full mesh IBGP network are
both overlay networks on top of the underlying IP networks.
Each IBGP session is an overlay edge supported by a TCP/IP
connection. Some IBGP peers are not adjacent physically.
They depend on IGP (Interior Gateway Protocol) to commu-
nicate across multiple hops. For example, in Fig. 1, the IBGP
session between router A and D is routed along an IGP path
through router B.
B. Reliability of IBGP Networks
A reliable IBGP control plane is very important to the qual-
ity of Internet routing. When an IBGP session is lost, all related
routes in the BGP routing tables have to be withdrawn and thus
some IP addresses become unreachable. The route withdrawal
messages trigger huge amount of route re-computations and
also result in route flaps. It usually takes a long time and lots
of network resource to re-establish this lost session.
On the other hand, the reliability and stability of IBGP
operations depend on the quality of underlying TCP and
IGP routing. It is reported that BGP sessions are sensitive
to transport layer stability and routing layer reliability [3][4],
especially for the IBGP sessions which cross multiple IP
hops. Therefore, understanding the influential factors on IBGP
reliability and furthermore finding proper methods to improve
IBGP robustness are very crucial for delivering highly avail-
able and stable services in Internet routing.
However, so far, issues, such as how to model the reliability
of IBGP, which is influenced by IGP routing and transport
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layer protocols, and how to improve the IBGP reliability within
the existing Internet framework, have not been well studied yet.
Our previous research [5][6] has shown that TCP provides only
a limited support of reliable communication for IBGP sessions
and failures in IP networks may make the IBGP sessions fail.
In this paper, we focus on analyzing the reliability of the whole
IBGP networks given the fact that IBGP sessions are unreliable
due to the influence from the underlying IP networks.
The reliability analysis in IBGP networks is complex due
to the correlations between different IBGP sessions. For ex-
ample, in Fig. 1, the IBGP session between H and E is
not statistically independent of the session between G and
E, because they share one IP link. Cui et al. [7] give an
approximate calculation on the probability that two overlay
links fail simultaneously. In this paper, we perform a much
more extensive study on the reliability of the overlay networks
in IBGP. By using the dependent network failure analysis
model [8] (based on independent failure-causing events), we
investigate the reliability of IBGP networks and propose two
novel metrics for network resilience: IBGP Failure Probability
(IFP) and Expected Connectivity Loss (ECL). In a nutshell, IFP
defines the probability of IBGP failures taking into account
conditional failures of IBGP sessions; ECL stands for the
average percentage of IBGP router pairs that are isolated in
the IBGP control plane.
With the reliability model for IBGP, we can answer many
meaningful questions on IBGP reliability and have a quantita-
tive guide in designing reliable IBGP networks. Previously,
when we migrated a full mesh IBGP network to a route
reflection network, we did not have a precise understanding
on the impact of this transition in terms of network reliability.
For example, does the network become less reliable because
the transition reduces the number of IBGP sessions? How
much reliability can we gain by introducing one redundant
reflector and how many reflectors are actually needed? How
to cluster routers? And, moreover, is it possible to design a
route reflection network that is even more reliable than the
full mesh IBGP? At present, the only guideline for setting up
reflection topology is to follow the physical topology [9]: in
large networks, route reflection topology is usually overlaid
with IGP hierarchy; routers are clustered according to IGP
areas; in each cluster, the core routers are selected as the
reflectors, and the others are clients of their core router. But,
in general, the reliable IBGP network design problem has not
been studied in the literature. In this paper, the IBGP reliability
optimization problems are formulated and studied based on the
reliability models and metrics we propose.
We aim to increase BGP routing reliability by configuring
IBGP route reflection networks appropriately without chang-
ing the standard of protocols, so that the rate and impact
of IBGP failures are minimized. The goal of design is to
minimize IFP or ECL. Our previous work [10] has addressed
a simplified design problem, in which redundant reflectors
are not considered. In this paper, we study the impact of
redundant IBGP components and how to find the reliable
IBGP networks in general scenarios. Specifically, we formally
prove that this optimization problem is NP-hard, even in some
simplified cases; we develop several efficient algorithms to
search for satisfactory near-optimal solutions; an optimization
lower bound is also given to show the room for improvement.
Our extensive computational experiments demonstrate that
based on the realistic Internet network topologies, we can find
both reliable and efficient solutions for IBGP networks, i.e.,
the solutions are very close to the global optima and have small
number of IBGP sessions involved. In addition, we investigate
the optimization problem in a special case – fully mesh IP
networks, which has strong application background and has
simplified solutions.
Besides the models and the optimization algorithms, we
have the following key insights into the design of reliable IBGP
route reflection networks. (1) Reliable IBGP network design
highly depends on the topology of IP networks, as well as the
specific reliability of each IP network component. Even in IP
networks where all routers and links have the same reliability,
some appropriately designed IBGP networks are much more
reliable than other options. (2) It is not always true that the
IBGP network with more redundant IBGP reflectors or more
IBGP sessions is more reliable. The redundant elements in
IBGP should be used properly. (3) Full mesh IBGP is often
not the best topology in terms of reliability, even though it has
maximum number of IBGP sessions and is traditionally used in
small networks. In some cases, we can design a more reliable
IBGP network by clustering routers and placing reflectors
appropriately.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we define the network models and describe the failures in
IBGP. In Section III, we present a reliability analysis frame-
work for IBGP and define two reliability metrics. In Section
IV, the methods for calculating the metrics are discussed,
followed by case studies to demonstrate the influential factors
on IBGP network reliability. Furthermore, we formulate the
reliability optimization problems for IBGP networks in Section
V and discuss the techniques for solving these problems. In
Section VII, related work is presented. Section VIII concludes
the paper.
II. NETWORK MODELS AND IBGP FAILURES
A. Network Models
We denote a typical IP network as graph G(V,E), where V
and E are the sets of routers and IP links, respectively. (u, v)
represents the IP link from router u to router v. IGP path from
u to v is denoted as Puv , which is the set of routers and links
on the path.
IBGP Route reflection network Gr(Vr, Er) is overlaid on
top of the IP network, where Vr is the set of IBGP routers
and Er is the set of IBGP sessions. We consider transitive
domains where every router runs BGP, and thus Vr = V . IBGP
session between u and v is denoted by 〈u, v〉. IGP paths Puv
and Pvu are used to support this session. We also use Pe to
denote the IGP path used by session e, where e ∈ Er. In
a two-level route reflection network, the nodes are grouped
into several clusters. Each cluster contains one or multiple
route reflectors. Er includes the full mesh of IBGP sessions
among all reflectors and the sessions between clients and their
reflectors. IBGP sessions between the clients in one cluster
2
are optional, which can be used to improve the reliability of
IBGP networks. In general, route reflection hierarchy can have
an arbitrary number of reflection levels, i.e., some reflectors
are the clients of some higher level reflectors, which are in
turn the clients of others, and so on. In this paper, we only
discuss two-level reflection networks.
B. Failures in IBGP Networks
In IBGP networks, both BGP routers and IBGP sessions
could fail due to the component failures1 in the supporting IP
networks.
1) Failures of BGP routers: Different routers, which have a
variety of software or hardware platforms, may show different
reliability in hosting BGP routing function. Running BGP
requires a large amount of resources for session maintenance,
route selection, handling routing updates and route storage,
especially when a router possesses many BGP sessions con-
currently. The router becomes less reliable if it is overloaded.
For example, memory allocation failures (either by running
out of memory or by memory segmentation) or extremely
high CPU utilization will cause a router to hang[15][16][17].
Thus, routers with larger amount of resources (CPU power and
memory) are more robust for handling BGP operations.
2) Failures of IBGP Sessions: BGP routers detect BGP
session failures using a heart-beat mechanism. Each BGP
router expects to receive at least one message from every peer
in a certain period of time, which is defined by the Hold
Timer. Accordingly, KEEPALIVE messages are sent to peers
to keep the sessions alive. Thus, any reasons which make
BGP messages delayed or lost, such as IP packet forwarding
failures, may further cause the related BGP sessions to be reset.
Although TCP retransmission can recover the lost packets in
case of network failures and congestion, BGP messages may
be severely delayed due to the routing recovery time and
the TCP retransmissions. If the BGP Hold Timer expires
because of the long delay, the IBGP sessions are broken.
Therefore, with some probability, the failures in IP networks
lead to the failures of the BGP sessions.
III. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS FOR IBGP NETWORKS
A. Analysis Framework
In route reflection network Gr(Vr, Er), the failures of differ-
ent edges, i.e., IBGP sessions, are not necessarily independent.
Two overlaid sessions may share the same IP routers or links
in their IGP paths. There are several approaches to studying
the network reliability with dependent component failures. In
this paper, we make use of the cause-based reliability analysis
model [8] in IBGP networks.
We identify all major failure scenarios in IP networks.
For example, a failure scenario can be the case in which
a single router or a single IP link fails. Different failure
scenarios happen independently. Let S denote the set of all
failure scenarios we are interested in plus one special scenario,
1In this paper, the failure means fail-stop, i.e., the failed components stop
functioning. We do not consider Byzantine failures, such as misbehaving or
adversaries in routing.
s0, where no failure exists. The probability that a scenario
happens can be derived from the historical network operation
information, and let rs denote the probability that scenario
s happens. If S includes all network states, ∑s∈S rs = 1.
Moreover, we use Fs to denote the set of components in IP
networks that fail in scenario s (s ∈ S), and Fs is a subset
of V ∪E. Other components in IP networks, which are not in
Fs, work properly.
In scenario s, the IBGP sessions that belong to the routers
in Fs fail. If Fs partitions the network, the IBGP sessions
crossing two partitioned sub-networks also fail. For example,
in Fig. 1, the failure of router G causes sessions 〈G,E〉
and 〈H,E〉 to fail. On the other hand, if the IP network is
not partitioned, the affected IBGP sessions may or may not
be broken, depending on the IGP routing recovery time. We
thus model the impact of IP network on IBGP sessions as a
probability variable. For example, in Fig. 1, if IP link (A,B)
fails, the IBGP sessions 〈A,D〉 and 〈A,B〉 fail with a certain
probability. In general, we denote qs as the conditional failure
probability of the IBGP sessions that are affected by the IP
network failures in scenario s, i.e.,
qs = Pr [session e fails | Fs fails and other components are up] ,
(1)
where e ∈ Er, s ∈ S, and Pe ∩ Fs = ∅. qs is related to the
IGP routing recovery time and the configuration parameters
in BGP and TCP retransmissions. In [5], we showed that qs
is not significantly affected by the round trip time between
the two BGP routers of an IBGP session. Thus, to simplify
the following discussion on IBGP route reflection topology
optimization problem, we assume that qs is the same for all
influenced IBGP sessions in scenario s. Moreover, in a given
failure scenario, all components in IP network G(V,E) are
in deterministic states. Each BGP router detects the session
failure independently. The BGP timers at different routers
are set and shifted independently, too. Thus, the conditional
failures of the affected IBGP sessions (with probability qs) are
independent, and we can apply reliability analysis techniques
in networks with independent failures.
Generally speaking, the size of S can be very large if
we want to cover all failure scenarios. However, in practice,
we can get a satisfying statistical coverage (i.e., ∑s∈S rs is
very close to 1) by only analyzing the failure scenarios that
could most likely happen. According to [18], the possibility
that multiple physical components fail simultaneously in one
administrative domain is extremely small. It is also shown that,
in IP networks, most of the failures only involve single IP
links or routers[19]. Therefore, in this paper, we assume that
at most one IP component fails at any time in one domain of
IP networks. Under this assumption, the number of network
failure states is |V |+ |E|, and this gives us enough precision
for the purpose of designing route reflection topology.
Note that several IP links may share one segment of fiber,
and thus they may fail coincidentally when the fiber is cut. In
this scenario, we can include the event of single fiber-cut as
a failure scenario in S, and analyze the simultaneous failures
of the related IP links. Similar analytic models can thus be
applied.
Table I summaries the major notations used in this paper.
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TABLE I
TABLE OF NOTATIONS
(u, v) Physical link from router u to router v
〈u, v〉 IBGP session between router u and router v
G(V,E) Physical network with router set V and link set E
Gr(Vr, Er) IBGP network with router set Vr and IBGP session set Er
Puv IGP path from router u to router v
S Set of all network failure scenarios
Fs Set of failed components in state s, Fs ⊆ V ∪ E
rs Probability that network failure scenario s occurs
qs Conditional session failure probability in scenario s
n Number of IBGP routers in a domain
m Number of IBGP sessions in a domain
θs Number of IBGP sessions owned by the routers in Fs
φs Number of IBGP sessions passing Fs but not owned by Fs
P IBGP failure probability (IFP)
Lc Expected connectivity loss (ECL)
B. Reliability Metrics
In order to characterize the reliability of IBGP route re-
flection networks, we propose two metrics in this section:
IBGP Failure Probability (IFP) and Expected Connectivity
Loss (ECL). Though our methods focus on route reflection
IBGP networks (and the full mesh IBGP), they can also be
applied to the confederation IBGP networks with very few
modifications.
We define the IBGP failure as the termination of one or
several non-optional IBGP sessions, which is caused by router
failures or IP link failures2. Moreover, we define θs as the
number of IBGP sessions that are owned by the routers in
Fs; let φs denote the the number of IBGP sessions that pass
Fs, but are not owned by Fs. θs and φs are determined by
the route reflection topology and its relation to the IP network
topology. For example, θs0 = 0 and φs0 = 0. If B fails in
Fig. 1, sessions 〈A,B〉, 〈B,C〉 and 〈B,D〉 fail, because they
are owned by B. However, session 〈A,D〉 only passes B, and
thus it fails with probability qs. Thus, θs = 3 and φs = 1.
1) IBGP Failure Probability (IFP) P: IFP means the prob-
ability that IBGP failure happens. Given a route reflection
network and the failure scenario set S, the probability of
IBGP failure P can be calculated from the probability of each
scenario and the topologies of IBGP networks:
P = 1−
∏
s∈S
[
1− rs + rs(1− qs)φs1{θs=0}
]
. (2)
At the right hand side of Equation 2, we calculate the prob-
ability of no IBGP failure for each scenario, which contains
two part: either the scenario does not happen or no sessions
actually fail.
In practice, if we only consider failures of single IP links
or routers, i.e., S = V ∪E, P in Equation 2 can be simplified
2We will show later that any non-optional IBGP session failure leads to
function loss of IBGP routing in the existing BGP protocol, no matter whether
redundant reflectors or sessions are employed (Lemma 4).
as
P = 1−
∏
s∈V
(1− rs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P¯V
∏
s∈E
[
1− rs + rs(1− qs)φs
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P¯E
. (3)
P¯V is the same for any IBGP route reflection topology, because
every router failure definitely breaks all the IBGP sessions
possessed by it and causes IBGP failure. P¯E is contributed by
IP link failures. If no IBGP sessions are deployed on a link
(i.e., φs = 0), its failure does not influence IBGP; otherwise,
the sessions passing it are influenced and fail with probability
qs. Thus, the probability of no IBGP failure is (1− qs)φs .
Because P¯V is not related to IBGP route reflection topolo-
gies, the optimization problem with respect to IFP only needs
to consider P¯E . Then, minimizing P is equivalent to maxi-
mizing P¯E .
2) Expected Connectivity Loss (ECL) Lc : IFP reflects
how likely an IBGP failure will happen. However, it does
not characterize how severe the IBGP failure is. Another
dimension in the design space is the amount of losses in
IBGP failures. We define an elaborate loss evaluation metric,
Expected Connectivity Loss (also called Expected Resilience
Loss), to characterize the detailed function loss of IBGP
networks, and denote it as Lc.
The function of an IBGP network is to distribute external
routing information, which is learned from outside of the AS,
to all other IBGP routers in this domain after necessary pro-
cessing. In a healthy network, there is a valid IBGP signaling
path between any two IBGP routers. BGP update information
originated from one router can be advertised to all other IBGP
routers in the domain by these IBGP signaling paths. Some of
these signaling paths are just direct IBGP sessions in the IBGP
networks; some of the paths involve multiple IBGP sessions
and reflectors. In network failure scenarios, if some IBGP
sessions fail, the IBGP signaling paths between some routers
become unavailable, and thus the function of IBGP network is
partially defunct. Therefore, we can use the number of failed
IBGP signaling paths to measure the function loss of IBGP
networks.
In network failure scenario s, if router i can not exchange
routing information with router j directly or indirectly due to
IBGP session failures, i and j are isolated from each other
and we denote this relation as i s j. Likewise, if i and j
are reachable to each other in failure state s, it is denoted as
i
s↔ j. Please note that two routers may be isolated even if
they are connected in a route reflection graph. For example, if
session 〈A,D〉 fails in Fig. 1, A and D are isolated. Though A
and D both share an IBGP session with B, B does not reflect
routes between A and D, because B is in the same cluster
as A. CLUSTER LIST loop detection policy [2] prevents this
type of route reflection. In Section IV, we will discuss the
calculation of the isolation probability by considering valid
route reflection.
In a full mesh IBGP network, any two routers communicate
directly using a dedicated IBGP session. If session 〈i, j〉 fails,
only i and j are isolated from each other. In a route reflection
network, the routers are organized hierarchically. One IBGP
session may on the signaling paths of multiple router pairs.
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Thus, the termination of one IBGP session may invalidate
several signaling paths. For example, in Fig. 1, the external
routing information learned by router H has to be reflected by
E, by I , and then it can be received by J . If IBGP session
〈H,E〉 fails, H is isolated from the other BGP routers in
the domain. In addition, failures of different IBGP sessions
or routers have different impacts on IBGP operations. For
instance, the termination of session 〈A,B〉 only makes A and
B isolated from each other. However, if session 〈E, I〉 breaks,
the routers in cluster II and III are isolated.
In a general IBGP network, based on the above descriptions
about IBGP function loss, the connectivity loss in scenario s,
denoted as Lc(s), is
Lc(s) =
2
∑
i,j∈Vr,i =j Pr[i
s
 j]
n2 − n , (4)
where n is the number of IBGP routers. On the other hand,
the IBGP network connectivity L¯s is
L¯c(s) = 1− Lc(s) =
2
∑
i,j∈Vr,i =j Pr[i
s↔ j]
n2 − n . (5)
Therefore, the ECL over the entire state space is Lc =∑
s∈S rsLc(s) and L¯c =
∑
s∈S rsL¯c(s), where rs is the
probability that the network is in state s. It is easy to verify
the following facts: 0 ≤ Lc, L¯c ≤ 1 and Lc + L¯c = 1.
In addition, the ECL metric reflects the routing service
availability to end users. From users’ point of view, routing
reliability means the reachability of network addresses which
further depends on the reliability of IBGP signaling routes.
IV. RELIABILITY CALCULATION OF IBGP NETWORKS
In this section, we discuss how to calculate the reliability
metrics based on the topology of IBGP networks. According to
Equation 2, we first need to calculate {θs} and {φs} based on
the relation between IP network topology and IBGP network
topology, and then compute IFP. The challenging part is to
calculate Lc, which can be reduced to computing network
connectedness [20] in IBGP signaling graphs. We will discuss
this in detail next, followed by a case study to show the
intuitions behind the metric definitions and the reliable IBGP
network design.
A. Calculation of IBGP Network Connectivity Loss Lc
In order to calculate the connectivity loss Lc, we need to
obtain the isolation probability Pr[i s j] for any pair of
nodes, i and j, in any failure scenario s. Because not all
paths in IBGP route reflection graph are valid signaling paths,
the reflection graph can not be used directly to calculate the
isolation probability, and we will define auxiliary graphs for
this purpose instead.
Let us first explain what is the valid IBGP signaling path. In
a route reflection network, if routing information is sent from
a client to its reflector, we define this advertising relationship
as C-R; similarly, R-C and R-R stand for sending routing
information from a reflector to its client and from a reflector
to its peer reflector in different clusters, respectively. Thus,
according to IETF RFC [2], the valid route advertising path is
the subsequence or the whole of the following sequence: C-R
⇒ . . . C-R ⇒ R-R ⇒ R-C. . . ⇒ R-C3.
The calculation of isolation probability can be reduced to
the (s, t)-connectedness problem4 [20] in the directed acyclic
graph Gsij in which the edges may fail independently. The
auxiliary graph Gsij is generated based on the route reflection
graph Gr(Vr, Er) with the following three modifications: (1)
The IBGP routers that fail in network failure scenario s and
the IBGP sessions they own are removed from Vr and Er.
(2) In Gsij , the edges, which pass Fs, have failure probability
qs; other edges have zero failure probability. (3) The nodes
and edges that are not on the valid IBGP signaling paths
between i and j in Gr(Vr, Er) are removed. In the resulted
graph after the above operations, the directions of the edges
are determined, such that the edge direction conforms to the
shortest path from i to j in terms of hop-count in graph Gr.
Lemma 1: A signaling path is valid, if and only if it is a
path in graph Gsij from i to j.
Proof Sketch: First, it is easy to see that the direction of every
edge in Gsij can be uniquely determined. In reflection graph
Gr, according to the rule of IBGP route reflection, the set of
all valid signaling paths from i to j is equivalent to the set of
shortest paths between i and j in terms of hop-count. Because
only the edges in Gr that are not used by signaling paths from
i to j are removed in Gsij and the edge directions in Gsij are
determined to conform to shortest paths from i to j, Gr and
Gsij share the same set of shortest paths from i to j. Thus, the
set of signaling paths is equivalent to the set of the shortest
paths in Gsij . Moreover, we can show that all paths from i to
j in Gsij have the same distance. Therefore, we conclude that
signaling path set is equivalent to the path set in Gsij . 
Based on the above lemma, the problem of computing the
isolation probability Pr[i s j] is equivalent to calculate the
probability that all paths from i to j fail in graph Gsij . Next,
we will focus on the two-level route reflection topology to
discuss the detailed calculation.
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different clusters.
Fig. 2. Gsij for calculating Pr[i
s
 j] in two-level route reflection networks.
In a two-level route reflection network, the routing in-
3If optional IBGP sessions between clients in the same cluster are used,
the signaling paths can also be C-C. Because signaling paths of this type
are independent of others and the related isolation probability can be simply
calculated, we ignore the optional sessions in this section for clarity.
4The (s, t)-connectedness problem aims to compute the probability that at
least one path from i to j does not fail in the directed probabilistic graph.
5
formation can be reflected at most twice. We thus divide
the calculations into the following three cases based on the
relationship between router i and router j. For convenience of
explanation, we denote the failure probability of IBGP session
〈u, v〉 in failure scenario s simply as puv .
First, if both i and j are reflectors or i is a client of the reflec-
tor j, because of route reflection rules and CLUSTER LIST
loop detection, the routes from i can not be reflected to j
by any other reflectors and vice versa. Thus, only one IBGP
signaling path exists and Pr[i s j] = pij .
Second, if i and j are clients in the same cluster or i is
a client and j is a reflector in other cluster, the graphs Gsij
of these two scenarios are shown in Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b),
respectively. There are |C| independent paths from i to j,
where C is the set of reflectors in the cluster of i. Thus,
Pr[i s j] =
∏
c∈C
(pic + pcj − picpcj) (6)
Third, if i and j are clients in different clusters, the graph
Gsij of this scenario is shown in Fig. 2(c). Ci and Cj are the
sets of reflectors in the cluster of i and j, respectively. There
are |Ci||Cj | different paths from i to j. Thus, Pr[i s j] is
the probability that all these paths fail. However, because these
paths are not independent, the probability calculation could be
a difficult problem. In general, the following lemma shows
that it is unlikely to find efficient solutions to calculate the
isolation probability in this scenario if |Ci| and |Cj | are large.
Lemma 2: If i and j are clients in different clusters, the
problem of computing Pr[i s j] is #P-complete.
Proof: The proof sketch is in Appendix I. 
In practice, if the sessions with zero failure probabilities
cover a path from i to j in Gsij , then Pr[i
s
 j] = 0; otherwise,
the isolation probability can be computed fast enough by some
existing network reliability analysis methods. The reasons are
that the number of IBGP sessions that have nonzero failure
probabilities in a failure scenario is small and the number of
redundant reflectors (|Ci| and |Cj |) is also quite limited. In
this paper, we use the factoring algorithms [21] to calculate
the isolation probability.
B. Case Studies - functional reliability analysis
We perform a functional reliability analysis on eight IBGP
networks which are overlaid on top of the same IP network.
The functional reliability analysis means to analyze the relia-
bility of the IBGP network in which the failure probabilities
of all components (including IBGP sessions) are the same.
Let us denote r as the happening probability of each failure
scenario and denote q as the conditional failure probability of
the influenced IBGP sessions in all network failure scenarios.
We only consider failures of single IP link or single router in
the following analysis.
Table II shows eight IBGP reflection networks and their
reliability metrics P and Lc. Except for Case (b) that has
two clusters, all cases have only one cluster. βk denotes 1 −
r + r(1 − q)k to simplify the representation of IFP P . We
use Case (c) as an example to show the computation. If E
fails, Lc(s) = 1010 , because all routers are definitely isolated; if
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Fig. 3. The comparison of expected connectivity loss.
A fails, A is isolated and B loses contact with others with
probability q, so Lc(s) = 4+3q10 ; etc. By combining Lc(s)
of all network failure scenarios, we obtain ECL of Case (c):
Lc = r10 (26+23q−q2). The calculation of P follows Equation
2.
It is straightforward to see that 1 − r ≤ βk ≤ 1 and βk ≥
βk+1. Thus, we have the order of IFP for the eight cases:
IFP P : (b) ≤ (c) ≤ (f) ≤ (d) ≤ (e) ≤ (a) = (g) = (h).
The above order holds for any q. However, the order of Lc is
slightly influenced by the specific value of q and the order is
shown in Fig. 3.
With respect to IFP, Case (b) is the best option, because
it has the minimum number of IBGP sessions and covers the
minimum number of IP links. Optimizing IFP tends to use
small number of IBGP sessions and IP links, which may lead
to large function loss in IBGP failures. On the other hand, ECL
takes into account the loss of IBGP failures. Case (b) and (c)
are less reliable than other cases with respect to ECL, such as
the traditional design in Case (a), due to the single point of
failure problem. For example, if E fails in (c), all routers are
isolated.
There are two ways to increase IBGP network resilience:
using redundant reflectors and adding redundant IBGP sessions
between clients. Case (d) employs two reflectors. It is much
more resilient than Case (c), due to the redundant reflectors
and three additional sessions. It is even more reliable than Case
(a) which has the maximum number of sessions. The reason is
that there is only one signaling path between any two routers
in Case (a), while multiple IBGP signaling paths may exist in
Case (d). Thus, the route reflection can avoid some cases of
router isolation. For example, if link (C,D) fails, in Case (a),
Pr[B s D] = q, because other routers do not reflect routes
between B and D. But, in Case (d), the redundant reflectors,
C and E, both reflect routes between B and D, i.e., there are
two independent paths from B to D in graph GsBD. Therefore,
the communication between B and D is not affected by the
failure of (C,D).
However, using more redundant reflectors does not nec-
essarily provide higher reliability. Case (e) uses one more
reflector and two more sessions than Case (d), but it still
performs worse. This is because a reflector can not reflect
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G, Gr
(a)
B
E
C D
A
(b)
B
E
C D
A
(c)
B
E
C D
A
(d)
B
E
C D
A
IFP : P 1− (1− r)5β33β22β1 1− (1− r)5β41 1− (1− r)5β2β31 1− (1− r)5β32β31
ECL : Lc r10 (20 + 18q) r10 (28 + 18q) r10 (26 + 23q − q2) r10 (20 + 11q + q2)
G, Gr
(e)
B
E
C D
A
(f)
B
E
C D
A
(g)
B
E
C D
A
(h)
B
E
C D
A
IFP : P 1− (1− r)5β23β22β21 1− (1− r)5β2β41 1− (1− r)5β33β22β1 1− (1− r)5β33β22β1
ECL : Lc r10 (20 + 15q) r10 (25 + 19q − q2) r10 (20 + 7q + 3q2) r10 (20 + 11q + q3)
TABLE II
CASE STUDIES OF ROUTE REFLECTION NETWORKS. r = rs , THE PROBABILITY OF A FAILURE SCENARIO. q = qs , THE FAILURE PROBABILITY OF IBGP
SESSIONS IN FAILURE SCENARIOS. βk = 1− r + r(1− q)k .
routes between its redundant reflectors and their clients (due
to CLUSTER LIST loop detection), i.e., too many reflectors
may make the IBGP signaling paths less redundant. In Case
(e), there is only one path in graph GsAD from A to D. If
link (D,E) fails, Pr[A s D] = q. But, in Case (d), two
independent paths exist, because both A and D are clients and
they can exchange routes via reflector C and E. Therefore, if
link (D,E) fails, Pr[A s D] = 0.
Using redundant sessions between clients of the same cluster
can also improve reliability. Based on Case (c), we introduce
one more session between node B and node C in Case (f). This
improves ECL, because the number of independent signaling
paths between B and C increases. Case (g) even constructs
a full mesh among all clients, and it is most reliable among
all these IBGP networks. In addition, in some scenario, using
many redundant sessions among clients can not improve ECL
significantly. For example, Case (h) only obtains very slightly
smaller ECL than Case (d), thus these three additional sessions
are not worthwhile.
In summary, this case study gives some intuitions about
optimizing IBGP networks for reliability: (1) The traditional
full mesh IBGP network is not the most reliable solution, and
we can make IBGP networks more reliable by introducing
redundant reflectors and sessions appropriately, without in-
curring much additional overhead; (2) Redundant reflectors
can improve BGP network reliability, but they have to be
used appropriately, because too many redundant reflectors may
decrease IBGP robustness.
V. RELIABILITY OPTIMIZATION FOR IBGP NETWORKS
In previous sections, we defined reliability metrics for IBGP
networks and showed that the route reflection topology affects
the reliability of an IBGP network. We observed that the
traditional IBGP network with the fully meshed IBGP sessions
is not the most reliable IBGP configuration, which motivates
us to optimize route reflection topologies to increase the IBGP
robustness. In this section, we discuss several categories of
optimization problems and their solutions. In next section, we
will present the experimental studies on these problems.
A. Optimization Problem Description and Complexity
The optimization objective is to minimize one of the three
metrics: IFP, ESL and ELT. We use M to denote any of the
metrics, and describe the general form of the optimization
problem as follows:
Problem 1 (Reliable RR Network Design): In IP network
G(V,E), given (1) the probabilities of failure scenarios
{rs|s ∈ S}, where S = V ∪ E, (2) IBGP session failure
probability {qs|s ∈ S}, and (3) all IGP paths, find the route
reflection network G∗r based on G, such that M(G∗r) ≤
M(Gr), for any route reflection network Gr based on G.
The design problem is called RR-IFP and RR-ECL, when
the metric to be minimized is IFP and ECL, respectively. The
lemma below shows the complexity of finding the optimum
solution for the general reliable IBGP route reflection design
problem.
Lemma 3: The reliable route reflection design problems,
RR-IFP and RR-ECL, are NP-hard.
Proof: We will show (in Lemma 7) that a special case
of the problems, where the IP network is a complete graph, is
NP-hard. Thus, RR-IFP and RR-ECL in general are NP-hard.
Since the general optimization problem is NP-hard, we need
heuristic algorithms to find satisfying near-optimal solutions in
practice. In order to have more insights into the design prob-
lem, we separate the optimization problem into two categories
according to the structure of IP networks, that is, optimization
in fully meshed IP networks and in general IP networks.
There are two reasons for this separation: (1) In the fully
meshed IP networks, the reliability metric computation and
IBGP topology optimization can be substantially simplified,
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from which we can obtain helpful intuitions on designing
the reliable IBGP network; (2) Investigating the fully meshed
IP networks is also useful in real applications. Small AS’s
may have the fully meshed IP links deployed to increase the
communication robustness. In large AS’s, the backbone routers
in one PoP usually are fully connected by IP links. Thus,
the design of IBGP route reflection inside fully meshed IP
networks has strong application background.
B. IBGP Reflection over Fully Meshed IP Networks
In a fully meshed IP network, all IGP routes are independent
of each other, except for the shared source nodes or destination
nodes. Therefore, any two IBGP sessions are independent of
each other unless they are owned by the same router. Due
to this property, the design problem of IBGP route reflection
topology can be significantly simplified.
In RR-IFP problem, because every IP link has at most one
IBGP session deployed, θij = 1, if router i and router j are
IBGP peers; otherwise, θij = 0. Based on Equation 3, we can
simplify the optimization objective as follows:
argmin
Gr
P = argmax
Gr
P¯E
= argmax
Gr
∏
〈i,j〉∈Er
(1− rijqij)
= argmin
Gr
∑
〈i,j〉∈Er
log
1
1− rijqij (7)
In RR-ECL problem, the optimization can also be simpli-
fied. In general, if a cluster has only one reflector, the reflector
becomes a bottleneck and the IBGP network will be severally
isolated when this critical router fails. (1) In IBGP networks
having only one cluster, optional sessions between clients can
solve this single point of failure problem, such as Case (g) in
Table II. However, a large number of optional IBGP sessions
have to be used, which is not scalable to large networks. (2) In
IBGP networks with multiple clusters, the failure of the single
reflector can isolate the cluster that the single reflector resides
in. In this case, the use of optional sessions does not help5
and significant amount of connectivity loss is thus caused.
Therefore, we set up more than one reflector in each cluster
as a general rule in this paper to provide a clear explanation
and we will briefly discuss the single reflector case after this
general case.
We first present a lemma to show the direct impact of a
BGP session failure on IBGP network connectivity.
Lemma 4: If IBGP session 〈u, v〉 fails and it is a non-
optional session in IBGP route reflection networks, router u
and router v are isolated from each other.
Proof: Since u and v share a required IBGP session, there are
three possible relationship between them: (reflector, reflector),
(client, single reflector), and (client, one of the multiple
reflectors). We use Fig. 1 as an example. If both u and v
are reflectors, such as A and E, because other reflectors can
not reflect routing information between two other reflectors,
u and v are isolated. If u is the only reflector of client v,
5Optional IBGP sessions are only used between clients in the same cluster.
v loses the single connection with the other IBGP routers. If
v has multiple reflectors, for example, C uses A and B as
its reflectors, because the CLUSTER LIST loop detection is
enforced, A (or B) does not reflect information from C to B
(or A). Therefore, by summarizing all scenarios, u and v are
isolated from each other. 
Please recall that n denotes the number of routers. Due to the
multiple reflectors in the fully meshed IP networks, we have
the following lemma concerning the connectivity loss caused
by network failures.
Lemma 5: If each cluster has more than one reflector in
the fully meshed IP network G(V,E), then the optional IBGP
sessions between clients in the same cluster do not influence
ECL, and moreover,
a) ECL caused by the failure of routers, written Lc(V ),
is irrelevant to reflection topology design, and Lc(V ) =
2
n
∑
i∈V ri, where ri is the probability that router i fails.
b) ECL caused by the failure of link (i, j), written Rc(i, j),
is nonzero only if router i and j share an IBGP session
〈i, j〉, and Lc(i, j) = 2n2−nrijqij .
Proof: Because all IGP routes are one-hop in the fully
meshed IP networks and the number of reflectors are more than
one in each cluster, there are at least two independent IBGP
signaling routes between any two clients in the same cluster
through the reflectors. Since, we only consider the single IP
component failure, the use of optional IBGP sessions, adding
another signaling path, does not influence ECL.
Single router failure only resets the IBGP sessions it pos-
sessed, and it does not influence the IBGP sessions between
other BGP routers, because all IBGP sessions cross only one
IP hop. To be more specifically, if the failed router is a client,
obviously the reflection structure is not changed; if it is a
reflector, the other redundant reflectors in the cluster ensure
the connectivity between the clients and other part of the IBGP
network. Thus, the failed router is the only isolated IBGP
router. No matter what reflection topology is used, ECL is
the same, and Lc(V ) =
∑
i∈V
2(n−1)
n2−n ri =
2
n
∑
i∈V ri.
In fully meshed IP network, session 〈i, j〉 only crosses link
(i, j) and link (i, j) can only be used by session 〈i, j〉. Thus,
route reflection network is influenced by link (i, j) if and only
if i and j share an IBGP session. We further argue that if
session 〈i, j〉 breaks, i and j is the only isolated pair as follows.
By lemma 4, we know that i and j are isolated from each other,
if 〈i, j〉 fails. Moreover, due to the redundant reflectors in each
cluster, the failure of 〈i, j〉 does not influence signaling paths
between routers except i and j. Therefore, the calculation of
ECL due to link (i, j) failure can be simplified as Lc(i, j) =
2
n2−nqijrij .
From the lemma above, the solution to RR-ECL problem in
the fully meshed IP network is
argmin
Gr
Lc = argmin
Gr
Lc(E) = argmin
Gr
∑
〈i,j〉∈Er
rijqij , (8)
and the optional sessions between clients in the same cluster
are not necessary.
By combining the results from Equations 7 and 8 together,
we note that the problems of reliable IBGP route reflection
network are equivalent to minimizing the weight summation
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of the whole route reflection graph. In a formal manner, let
W(Gr) denote the weight summation of all links in route
reflection graph Gr, i.e., W(Gr) =
∑
〈i,j〉∈Er wij . We have
the following problem formulation.
Problem 2 (Simplified Reliable RR Network Design):
In the complete graph G(V,E), given the link weight
{wij |i, j ∈ V }, find a subgraph of G to be the route reflection
network G∗r , such that W(G∗r) ≤ W(Gr), for any route
reflection network Gr based on G.
Specifically, in RR-IFP problem, wij = − log (1− rijqij);
in RR-ECL problem wij = rijqij . It is interesting to note
that these two weight definitions are approximately the same
when rijqij is small, because log(1 + x)  x for small x.
In the existing Internet, the network failure probabilities are
indeed very small, and therefore, RR-IFP and RR-ECL have
approximately the same optimization objective in fully meshed
IP networks, i.e., if we find the optimum solution for one, we
get an approximate solution for the other.
Intuitively, in order to minimize W(Gr), we would like to
make use of reliable IP links and have a small number of IP
links involved in route reflection networks. The traditional full
mesh IBGP network has every IP link involved, and thus it has
worse reliability than other properly designed IBGP networks.
Quantitatively, in the fully meshed IP networks G(V,E), if
the traditional full mesh IBGP is used, P = 1 −∏i∈V (1 −
qi)
∏
e∈E(1− qere), and Lc = 2n
∑
i∈V ri+
∑
e∈E
2
n2−nreqe.
In later sections, we will see how much reliability improvement
can be made by route reflection network optimization.
1) Single-cluster Case: We impose one more constraint on
the optimization problem: only one cluster is allowed. This
restriction is reasonable in small IP networks. Two important
questions need to be answered: how many redundant reflectors
are needed, and where to place reflectors. The following lemma
gives the optimum number of reflectors.
Lemma 6: In fully meshed IP networks, if a single cluster
is used in the overlaid IBGP route reflection network, the
optimum number of reflectors is 2.
Proof: Because there are at least two reflectors in the
cluster, we only need to show that any reflection network with
k+1 reflectors (k ≥ 2), written Gk+1r , has larger W(Gr) than
a reflection network with k reflectors, written Gkr . In network
Gk+1r , we choose arbitrarily one reflector i and change it into
client to obtain a new reflection network Gkr . The sessions
between i and other reflectors in Gk+1r remain in Gkr , but they
change from R-R relationship to R-C relationship. The sessions
between i and the clients in Gk+1r are missing in Gkr , because
sessions between clients are not required. Other sessions are
the same in the two networks. Thus, Gkr .Er ⊂ Gk+1r .Er. It
follows naturally that W(Gkr ) < W(Gk+1r ). Therefore, the
optimum number of reflectors is 2.
Lemma 6 shows that the route reflection network is most
reliable if two reflectors are used. Using more reflectors
actually decreases the reliability of the IBGP network, even
though more resources are consumed. The intuitive reason is
that more redundant reflectors lead to less number of IBGP
signaling paths in route reflection networks. As an extreme
example, in the traditional full mesh IBGP network where
every router can be viewed as a reflector, only one signaling
path exists between any two routers and it is less reliable than
the IBGP networks with fewer route reflectors.
We can thus directly obtain an algorithm, from Lemma 6,
to find the optimum route reflection network by enumerating
all reflector pairs. The optimum placement of reflectors is:
arg min
i,j∈V
Mi +Mj − wij , (9)
where Mi =
∑
k =i,k∈V wik, ∀i ∈ V . In the resulted IBGP
network, 2n− 3 IBGP sessions are used.
Discussions: Besides the IBGP design with redundant re-
flectors, it is also possible to create the redundancy by using
optional IBGP sessions between clients. That is, we choose
one router to be the single reflector, the remaining routers are
clients, and the clients form a full mesh of IBGP sessions. In
this design, between any two clients there are two independent
IBGP signaling paths; however, between the reflector and a
client there is still only one signaling path. Thus, the optimum
reflector is determined by argmini∈V Mi. The optimized ECL
is smaller than the previous redundant reflector design shown
in Equation 9, but the number of IBGP sessions is
(
n
2
)
, which
is much larger than the redundant reflector design (2n− 3).
2) Multi-cluster Case: In this section, we consider the case
of multiple clusters and the problems of both router clustering
and reflector placement in fully meshed IP networks. Because
using only one reflector in a cluster may isolate the whole
cluster in the multi-cluster case, we focus on the design with
redundant reflectors in a cluster. We have the following lemma
concerning the complexity of the problem.
Lemma 7: In fully meshed IP networks, the simplified re-
liable RR network design problem, RR-IFP and RR-ECL, is
NP-hard.
Proof: The proof is in appendix II.
Router clustering makes the problem much harder than the
single-cluster case. In order to solve the design problem, we
need heuristic algorithms, which will be discussed in next
section. Moreover, we introduce an Integer Linear Program-
ming (ILP) model for solving this problem, especially for fully
meshed IP networks. The ILP model can be used to find the
optimum solution when the network size is not large by using
some powerful mathematical programming solvers, such as
CPLEX [22].
Let us consider the problem in which the number of clusters
is fixed to be nc. We define the following binary variables:
gij = 1 means router i is a reflector in cluster j; hij = 1
indicates router i is a client in cluster j; sij = 1 means router
i and router j share an IBGP session; otherwise, these variables
are zero. Below is the ILP formulation.∑
i∈V
gij = nr 1 ≤ j ≤ nc (10)∑
1≤j≤nc
gij + hij = 1 ∀i ∈ V (11)
sij ≥
∑
1≤k≤nc
(gik + gjk)− 1 ∀i, j ∈ V, i < j (12)
sij ≥ gik + hjk − 1 ∀i, j ∈ V, i < j, 1 ≤ k ≤ nc (13)
sij ≥ gjk + hik − 1 ∀i, j ∈ V, i < j, 1 ≤ k ≤ nc (14)
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The optimization objective is as follows.
min
∑
i,j∈V,i<j
wijsij (15)
Formula 10 ensures that the number of reflectors in one
cluster is nr (nr = 2 in our discussion). Formula 11 guarantees
that any router can be either a reflector or a client in just one
cluster. Formula 12 ensures that two reflectors share one IBGP
session. Formulas 13 and 14 guarantee that a reflector and
any of its clients share one IBGP session. Moreover, we can
avoid the unnecessary searching in clustering the routers by
the following constraints, which are not required for defining
a valid route reflection network but can improve the speed of
solving the optimization problem.
∑
i∈V
(hi j + gi j) ≤
∑
i∈V
(hi j+1 + gi j+1) ∀i ∈ V, i ≤ n− 1 (16)
Because at least two reflectors are required in one cluster,
the range of nc is from 1 to n2 , we can use CPLEX to solve
the optimization problem by enumerating all possible values
of nc, and choose the optimal nc and the reflection topology.
Furthermore, as a special case, if all links and routers are
uniform in terms of reliability, the following lemma shows that
the single-cluster design is the solution.
Lemma 8: In a fully meshed IP network, if each failure
scenario probability (rs) and each conditional IBGP session
failure probability (qs) are the same, the single-cluster design
is the optimum solution for the simplified reliable RR network
design problem.
Proof: Because all links and routers are uniform, wij
is the same for any i-j pair. Thus, W(Gr) is proportional to
the number of IBGP sessions used in the reflection network.
Given that there are two reflectors in one cluster, the number
of sessions is
(
2nc
2
)
+2(n−2nc) = 2n+2n2c−5nc. Therefore,
if nc = 1, W(Gr) is minimized.
Therefore, in this special case, this problem is reduced to
the problem in Section V-B.1.
C. IBGP Reflection over General IP Networks
If the IP network topology is a general graph, the optimiza-
tion problems are much more difficult to solve than in the
fully meshed IP network. Moreover, optimizing RR-IFP and
RR-ECL may lead to different results, even if the network
failure probabilities are small, as has been demonstrated in
Section IV-B.
The mathematical programming model for RR-IFP problem
includes the Formulas 10-14, and the following formula:
ul =
∑
i=j,i,j∈V
sijfijl, ∀l ∈ E, (17)
where binary variable fijl is one if IGP path Pij passes IP
link l; otherwise fijl is zero. Thus, ul stands for the number
of IBGP sessions passing link l. fijl can be calculated from
IGP routing results. The optimization objective is to maximize
P¯E in Equation 3, i.e.,
max
∑
l∈E
log (1− rl + rl (1− ql)ul) . (18)
This model contains a nonlinear component. In a special case,
where qs = 1 for any failure scenario s, the above model
becomes linear, and can be solved using tools such as CPLEX.
In RR-ECL problem, there even does not exist a closed-
form model to formulate the problem because of the difficulty
in calculating the ECL metric. Therefore, in order to solve
the general form of RR-ECL and RR-IFP problems, we apply
iterative search techniques. The basic ideas are: probing and
calculating various configurations of IBGP networks, choosing
the next searching target according to some rules, and optimiz-
ing the reliability iteratively. In the following text, we focus
on RR-ECL problem to explain the optimization techniques.
1) Greedy Select (GS): Greedy Select (GS) is an intuitive
way to design reliable reflection topologies. We first randomly
pick up several routers to be reflectors from a candidate re-
flector set, each reflector is designated to be in an independent
cluster, and each of the remaining routers (clients) is connected
to a reflector which has the most reliable IGP path to it. In each
cluster, the most reliable router other than the existing reflector
is chosen as the second reflector. GS repeats this iteration for
many times and returns the best topology it finds. In this paper,
for a network with n BGP routers, GS iterates for 2n2 times.
In each iteration, the candidate reflector set consists of the top
60% of the most reliable routers.
2) Tabu Search (TS): Tabu Search (TS) is an efficient meta-
heuristic algorithm which can find satisfactory near-optimal
solutions in large combinatorial optimization problems. Due
to the space limit, we skip the details on tabu search itself,
but briefly describe the specific settings we use for solving
RR-ECL problem. Interested readers are referred to [23] on
the basics of tabu search.
TS optimization is performed based on a fixed number
of clusters. We search through all possible values of cluster
numbers (from 1 to n) by TS to find the smallest value of
ECL. In each TS optimization, we take a two-level approach
to optimize RR topologies as follows. At the higher level, the
placement of reflectors is optimized; at the lower lever, with
the fixed reflectors structure, we optimize the assignment of the
clients to reflectors. The neighborhood structure of the reflector
placement is defined by the following procedures: swapping
two reflectors in different clusters, swapping a reflector with
a client, changing a reflector to be a client, and changing a
client to be a reflector. The neighborhood structure of client
assignment is defined by moving a client from one cluster to
another cluster. The tabu list contains the new clients, the new
reflectors, and the clients just being moved to avoid loops in
the searching process. However, if a neighboring solution is
better than the best result found so far, the tabu condition is
disabled. The initial RR topology is generated by using the
GS algorithm.
Previously, we has shown that the robustness of IBGP
can be increased by using optional IBGP sessions between
clients in the same cluster. However, using a large number
of optional sessions increases the overhead of BGP routers,
especially in large networks. Thus, in practice, we have to
make a tradeoff between the scalability and robustness. This
tradeoff can also be implemented in our heuristic searching
algorithms. In addition, our experimental results, which are
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based on the realistic Internet network topologies and will be
presented later, show that by using optional IBGP sessions,
the robustness of IBGP is increased only slightly, compared
with the appropriately designed IBGP route reflection networks
with no optional sessions, which means that we can obtain
both reliable and efficient IBGP networks without using many
IBGP sessions.
Using TS, we can find the optimum RR topology for the IP
network in the case study previously discussed in Section IV-B.
The best RR topology without using optional BGP sessions is:
forming one cluster and router B and E being reflectors. The
ECL is 20+11q10 r. The result is better than Case (h) which uses
the maximum number of sessions. This example demonstrates
the benefits of designing the RR topology properly. When the
optional session is allowed, Case (g) is the best design.
3) Lower Bound of ECL optimization: We develop a lower
bound for the minimum ECL in RR-ECL problem to evaluate
the performance of our optimization algorithms. For con-
venience, we rank all links in IP network G(V,E) based
on the product of the scenario occurrence probability and
the corresponding conditional session failure probability, i.e.,
{rsqs|s ∈ E}; let r˜(i) denote the ith smallest value.
Lemma 9: In IP network G(V,E), the lower bound for the
solution of RR-ECL problem is L( |V |2 )
, where
L =
∑
i∈V
(|V | − 1)ri +max
⎛
⎝(2|V | − 3)r˜(1), |V |−1∑
i=1
r˜(i)
⎞
⎠ . (19)
Proof: We analyze the bound by considering router
failures and IP link failures separately as follows. (1) On each
router failure, we underestimate the ECL by only considering
the router isolation related to the failed router. Thus, at least
|V | − 1 pairs of routers are isolated due to the single router
failure, which contributes to the first term in Equation 19. (2)
Because the minimum number of the non-optional sessions
is 2|V | − 3 (see the proof of Lemma 8) and each session
is influenced by at least one IP link, the minimum amount
contributed by these links is (2|V | − 3)r˜(1) 6. On the other
hand, at least |V | − 1 IP links are used by IBGP sessions;
otherwise, the IBGP network is not connected at the routing
layer. These links contribute at least
∑|V |−1
i=1 r˜(i) to ECL.
Moreover, by finding the maximum of the above two values,
we get the second term in Equation 19.
In IP networks that are not strongly connected, the failures
of the critical links or nodes can partition the network. For
example, in Fig. 1 node G is a critical node. The above lemma
can be extended to give a tighter lower bound in this case. We
denote N(i) to be the number of node pairs (including the
failed nodes) that are partitioned due to the failure of i, where
i ∈ V ∪ E. r˜(i) is determined only based on the non-critical
links (i.e., the links that can not partition the network). Then,
similar to the reasoning in Lemma 9, the lower bound of ECL
is L( |V |2 )
, where
L =
∑
i∈V ∪E
N(i)ri +
|V |−1−β∑
i=1
r˜(i), (20)
6Please note that if a non-optional IBGP session fails, the related two IBGP
routers are isolated (see Lemma 4).
where β is the number of the critical IP links which can
partition the network.
D. Summary of the Problems and the Solutions
Based on the above discussions on optimizing IBGP route
reflection networks, we summarize the problem categories and
the time complexities of the solutions in Fig. 4. In some
special cases, we can find the optimum design by polynomial
algorithms. In general cases, we have to use heuristics based
on iterative searching to obtain the near-optimal solutions.
O(n2)
General RR Design
Fully meshed IP
network
Single Cluster
Design
Multiple Cluster
Design
Uniform routers
and links
Heterogeneous
routers and links
constant NP
Genearl IP
network
ILP
NP LocalSearch
Fig. 4. Reliable IBGP RR network design problems.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES OF IBGP NETWORK
OPTIMIZATION
A. Fully meshed IP Networks
In fully meshed IP networks, the RR network design is
irrelevant to the reliability of BGP routers. Thus, in this
subsection, we assume that all BGP routers are perfect. The
failure probabilities of IP links pf is generated randomly
from the interval [0.02 − δ, 0.02 + δ], where δ equals 0.005,
0.01, and 0.02, respectively, in the three cases to be studied.
The failure scenario occurrence probability is re and re =
pf (e)
∏
l =e[1 − pf (l)]. The IBGP session conditional failure
probability, qe, is 0.31, which corresponds to 36 seconds failure
recovery time under the default setting of BGP and TCP
timers [5]. In addition, because reqe is small, the results of the
RR-IFP problem are approximately the same as the RR-ECL
problem, and thus we only describe the results of RR-ECL as
follows.
In the single-cluster design problem in a network of 20
nodes, we enumerate all possible route reflection networks
with two and three reflectors, calculate the ECL for each
configuration, sort by ECL, and draw the results in Fig. 5.
In the figure, each point stands for a feasible solution to the
RR network design problem. The optimum solutions for the
three cases are marked in the figure. The IBGP networks with
three reflectors are worse than the IBGP networks with two
reflectors, which confirms the statement in lemma 6. We also
notice that the range of ECL is larger when the range of the
link failure probability is higher, which means that we can take
advantage of more reliable links and avoid using unreliable
links to make RR network more robust.
In the case of multi-cluster design, we use CPLEX to solve
the ILP model discussed in Section V-B.2. In a fully meshed
IP network with 14 nodes, the link failure probabilities are
11
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TABLE III
IP NETWORKS USED IN EXPERIMENTS.
Name Router Number Link Number Description
WM20 20 40 Waxman Model, Brite
WM40 40 80 Waxman Model, Brite
AS6461 19 34 RocketFuel
AS3251 41 87 RocketFuel
generated randomly with δ set to 0, 0.01 or 0.02. Fig. 6 shows
the optimization results of when the number of clusters nc are
1 through 7. If the link failure probabilities are the same for all
IP links, ECL increases monotonically as nc, and the single-
cluster design has the smallest ECL, which confirms Lemma
8. On the other hand, if the link failure probabilities are not
the same, as shown in the figure, the optimal cluster number
is two in these two cases. The reason is that IBGP sessions
can be arranged to avoid passing unreliable links by grouping
routers into multiple clusters appropriately.
B. General IP Networks
The general network topologies we used in our experiment
are summarized in Table III. The first two topologies are gen-
erated by Brite topology generator [24] at the router level with
Waxman model. The other two are PoP level topologies taken
from the rocketfuel project [25], which stands for building a
third level route reflection on top of the PoP graphs.
The failure probability of each router is randomly generated
from interval [0.02−a, 0.02+a] and the link failure probability
is generated from [0.04−b, 0.04+b]. In our experiment, we test
two settings of a and b: one is (a, b) = (0.02, 0.04); the other
is (a, b) = (0.005, 0.005). We call them I and II, which stand
for large and small variances of network component failure
probabilities, respectively. Thus, we denote the experiment
configuration with network WM20 and the first failure setting
as ‘WM20-I’ and other configurations are similarly denoted.
We develop and implement an efficient TS algorithm to
solve the RR-ECL problem. Fig. 7 demonstrates the optimiza-
tion results of TS with respect to different numbers of clusters.
In this network (WM20), the optimal cluster number is 2. It
is interesting to note that, in the scenario of larger variance
of network component failure probability, we can find RR
topology with smaller ECL by deploying reflectors and IBGP
sessions on the more reliable router and links.
In Fig. 8 and 9, we compare the optimization results of
GS and TS with the traditional fully meshed IBGP and the
lower bound of ECL in all eight scenarios. It is obvious to
observe that by performing RR topology optimization, we can
find much more reliable IBGP RR network than the traditional
fully meshed IBGP. Even the simple GS algorithm can achieve
significant improvement in terms of reliability. By using TS,
ECL can be further minimized. Comparing the results with the
lower bound of ECL, we conclude that the TS algorithm can
find satisfying results which are close to the global optimum
solution.
Previously, we have discussed that the reliability of IBGP
networks can be improved by using optional sessions between
clients of the same cluster. In Fig. 10, we compare the results
if the optional sessions are allowed with the results when
no optional sessions are used in the algorithm of TS. The
figure shows that in the network topologies we studied, the
use of optional sessions only improves IBGP reliability very
slightly. The reason is that, in these networks, the impact of
single component failures on IBGP is already minimized to a
small level by placing appropriately redundant reflectors and
clustering routers. Thus, the optional sessions are not necessary
in these cases and the additional cost in managing the optional
sessions in saved. Therefore, we can design both reliable and
efficient IBGP route reflection networks.
VII. RELATED WORK
Some recent research addresses the challenges of improving
BGP reliability. Sangli et al. [11] propose a graceful restart
mechanism for BGP to alleviate the impact of BGP session
failures. BGP Scalable Transport (BST) [12] uses application
level replication and flooding to substitute TCP for reliable
and scalable BGP message distribution. However, besides the
deployment difficulties, BST can not replace the hierarchical
IBGP design (e.g. route reflection) because a BGP router can
not have a large number of BGP peers. Therefore, we still
need to consider how to construct a reliable router hierarchy to
provide robust IBGP. Different from these existing approaches,
our work aims to increase BGP routing reliability, without
modifying any protocol details, by configuring IBGP route
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reflection networks appropriately, so that the rate and impact
of IBGP failures are minimized.
Besides reliability, routing convergence is also an important
issue in IBGP. The convergent routing can be ensured by
either changing route advertising in IBGP or restricting the
configuration of IBGP networks. Basu et al. [13] extend the
route reflection policies to prevent route oscillations. The
basic idea is to advertise not only the best route but also
other received routes. Griffin et al. [14] present sufficient
conditions to guarantee deterministic and unique IBGP routing
and to avoid forwarding deflections. We view the convergence
and the reliability issues as two parallel objectives in the
design of IBGP networks. In practice, multiple factors should
be considered in determining the favorable route reflection
topologies. In this paper, we focus on the reliability issue.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The reliability of IBGP networks has a remarkable impact
on the dependability of Internet routing. Based on the existing
Internet framework, how to model and how to improve the
resilience of IBGP networks are of significant importance. In
this paper, we propose a reliability model and two novel relia-
bility metrics for IBGP networks, which take into account the
dependent failures of IBGP sessions and quantify the resilience
of IBGP networks in various network failure scenarios. Then,
we formulate the optimization problems for finding the most
reliable route reflection networks and analyze their properties
in the fully meshed IP networks and general networks. More-
over, several efficient algorithms are developed to solve the
problems efficiently. Through extensive experiments, we show
that our model is effective in characterizing the resilience of
IBGP networks and we can find satisfying designs which are
close to the global optimum solutions.
In our future research, we will take into account other
important properties of IBGP route reflection networks, such as
convergence. We would like to study the co-design of IBGP
networks by considering reliability and other factors, which
can lead us to a rational approach to network protocol design
and configuration.
APPENDIX I
PROOF SKETCH OF LEMMA 2
The problem of computing Pr[i s j] is equivalent to
finding the probability that all paths from i to j fail in graph
Gsij (shown in Fig. 2(c)). Though Ci and Cj form a complete
bipartite, it is a more general case than a general bipartite,
because if one edge does not exist, the corresponding edge in
Gsij can have 1 as the failure probability. Thus, the reduced
result of Corollary 3.4 in chapter 3.2 of [20] by using the proof
technique of Theorem 3.2 in [20] is a special case of Gsij .
Bipartite Independent Set problem, which is #P-complete,
can be reduced to the problem of computing Pr[i s j], and
therefore the result in the lemma follows.
APPENDIX II
COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we show that the simplified route reflection
network design described in Problem 2 is NP-hard. We in-
vestigate a special case of Problem 2 in which the number of
clusters is k and the number of reflectors in each cluster is one,
and we call this special route reflection problem k-SRR. This
simplification is also useful in the case of IFP minimization.
Uncapacitated Facility Location Problem (UFL) is proved
to be NP-hard in [26]. In UFL, F is a set of nf potential
facilities, and D is a set of nd clients. For any i ∈ F , a fixed
nonnegative cost fi is given as the opening cost of facility
i. For every client i ∈ D and facility j ∈ F , there is a
connection cost cij between client i and facility j. The problem
is to open a subset of the facilities of F , and assign every
client to an open facility such that the total cost, including
the opening cost and the connection cost, is minimized. That
is min
F ′⊆F
[ ∑
i∈F ′
fi +
∑
i∈D
min
j∈F ′
cij
]
. It is easy to see that the
problem is still NP-hard even if the number of the opened
facilities is fixed to k, because by enumerating k from 1 to
nf , we can find the solution for UFL in polynomial number of
iterations. We call the UFL problem with k opened facilities
k-UFL problem. Next, we will reduce k-SRR from k-UFL
problem.
Lemma 10: k-SRR problem is NP-hard.
Proof: From the k-UFL problem, we construct a graph,
as shown in Fig. 11, to form the k-sRRD problem. We define
sets F = {Fi | 1 ≤ i ≤ nf} and D = {Di | 1 ≤ i ≤ nd} to
be set of facilities and set of clients, respectively. An auxiliary
node T is also introduced. The link weights of the graph are
set as follows: (1) For any Fi ∈ F, the weight between T and
Fi is fiM , where M is a very large positive number; (2) The
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weight between T and any Di ∈ D is infinity; (3) For any
link between Fi, Fj ∈ F, the weight is fi+fjk−1 ; (4) The weight
of a link between any two nodes in D is infinity; (5) For any
Fj ∈ F and Di ∈ D, the weight is cji.
Fig. 11. Reduction from k-UFL to k-SRR.
By constructing the graph in Fig. 11, we map the k-UFL
problem into the (k+1)-SRR problem. The following verifies
that this mapping is valid. Because the weight between any
two nodes in {T} ∪ D is infinity, at most one node from
{T} ∪D can be chosen as the reflector. We choose M large
enough, i.e., M  max
(
max
i,j,l
fl
cij
, max
i,j,l
(k−1)fl
fi+fj
)
, such that
T is guaranteed to be a reflector. The other k reflectors are
chosen from F.
Because the weight between T and any node inD is infinity,
the nodes in D can only be assigned to the reflectors in F.
Likewise, due to the large M , the nodes in F that are not
reflectors are assigned to the reflector T . Therefore, the total
weight of the reflection graph, W(Gr), is
W(Gr) = weight of reflector mesh + weight of client connections
=
∑
i,j∈R
wij +
∑
i∈C
min
j∈R
cij
= min
F ′⊆F
|F ′|=k
(∑
i∈F
fi/M +
∑
i∈F ′
fi +
∑
i∈D
min
j∈F ′
cij
)
= min
F ′⊆F
|F ′|=k
(∑
i∈F ′
fi +
∑
i∈D
min
j∈F ′
cij
)
+ C (21)
where C =
∑
i∈F
fi/M and C is a constant. From Equation 21,
the (k+1)-SRR problem has the same optimization function as
the k-UFL problem. Therefore, we proved that k-SRR problem
is NP-hard.
Finally, since the k-SRR problem is a special case of
Problem 2, we know that Problem 2 is NP-hard.
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